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Abstract 
Dynamic agenda representation can be understood through the transmission of the 
priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The pattern of representation 
in policy agendas is mediated through institutions due to friction in decision-making and the 
scarcity of attention. The paper builds on extant studies of agenda correspondence through 
undertaking time series analysis of agenda representation using comparative data for the US 
and the UK, from 1951 to 2003, relating to executive speeches, laws and budgets in 
combination with data on public opinion about the ‘most important problem’. The results 
show that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions 
are subject to less friction (executive speeches) and declines as friction against policy change 
increases (laws and budgets) and decision-makers become less concerned with agenda-setting 
(budgets).  
 
 
Keywords: agendas, representation, institutions, public opinion  
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If public opinion changes, and then the policy priorities of government respond, this is 
dynamic agenda representation.1 “Problem solving” Baumgartner and Jones (2004, p. 1) 
argue “…is a critical component of competent government, and problems cannot be solved 
without attending to them.” Citizens hold opinions about the desirability of a wide range of 
outcomes, such as in relation to crime, economic growth, defence and public health (Arnold 
1990, pp. 17-18), and those outcomes (and problems) underpin the issue priorities of the 
public, offering incentives for government to earmark topics for policy action. Because of 
this, the allocation of attention is an important dimension of representation (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2004; Jones et al. 2009). In some instances agenda representation is a necessary 
condition for policy (i.e. positional) representation to occur (Baumgartner and Jones 2004, p. 
2), i.e. there is less likelihood of policy change on those issues that do not make it onto the 
agenda. It is well-established, however, that policy-makers have finite capacity to attend to 
issues and act upon them (inter alia Padgett 1980; Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005a; 2005b; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Adler and Wilkerson 2012). The relative abundance 
of information and the costs of information retrieval and processing require decision-makers 
to select issues for attention, creating inherent trade-offs in policy-making and necessitating 
prioritization between competing concerns. As has been shown, this has consequences for 
agenda representation (Baumgartner and Jones 2004; Jones et al. 2009; Chaqués Bonafont 
and Palau 2011). When the attention of institutions is most scarce (and the carrying capacity 
of the policy agenda is lowest), the prioritization of issues is most important for patterns of 
representation. In institutions where fewer direct trade-offs between issues need to be made, 
such as in appropriations and outlays of expenditure, prioritization is less important and 
                                                 
1 Note that this formulation is adapted from Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson’s (1995, p. 543) 
definition of dynamic representation. 
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policy-makers can focus on responding to public preferences across a wider portfolio of 
issues in parallel.  
This paper draws upon the previous literature on dynamic representation (Stimson et 
al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002; also see Wlezien 1996; Soroka and Wlezien 2010) through a 
comparative design that examines how attention scarcity and institutional friction affect the 
responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities expressed through the ‘most important 
problem’ (MIP) question across three different institutional venues (i.e. executive, legislative 
and budgetary agendas) in the US and the UK. Further, it extends research on correspondence 
between public priorities and policy agendas across institutional venues (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2004; Jones et al. 2009; Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011) through analysis of policy 
agenda representation over time, what we call dynamic agenda representation, and adds the 
case of the UK to existing studies of the US and Spain. Furthermore, rather than using static 
correspondence analysis, it uses time series analysis to consider how the representation of 
public priorities is structured in time to account for the dynamics inherent to each of the 
institutional agendas investigated. Its concern with whether government and the public are 
attending to the same issues distinguishes it from studies of dynamic representation that 
examine the link between public preferences and public policy across governing institutions 
(Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), and which instead 
consider the positional dimension of representation. Our approach therefore examines the 
attention-dimension of representation. 
The paper is organised as follows. We first re-tread some theoretical ground covered 
by Jones et al. (2009) highlighting the positional- and attention-dimensions of representation, 
and the role of friction in shaping representation across governing processes. We clarify some 
of our own insights on the dynamic aspects of agenda representation which to date have not 
been explored. We then introduce data on institutional agendas in the US and the UK, noting 
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key features of our comparative design. Through the estimation of time series error-
correction models we find that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities 
decreases as the level of institutional friction increases and as attention scarcity decreases. 
While there is variation between countries in the individual issue categories that policy 
agendas are responsive to public priorities for, there is nevertheless a general pattern of 
dynamic agenda representation across institutional venues which suggests that the influence 
of public priorities is greatest where attention is scarcest and institutional friction is lowest.     
 
Dynamic Representation and Agenda-Setting 
 There is a substantial literature that demonstrates dynamic representation of public 
preferences in policy-making at the aggregate level (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson et 
al. 1995; Wlezien 1996; Erikson et al. 2002; Hakhverdian 2010; Bartle et al. 2011). Similar 
patterns are observed in cross-national comparisons (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Hobolt 
and Klemmensen 2008). Such studies tend to emphasize the continuous, equilibrating 
character of shifts in the attitudes of citizens and public policy. Stimson et al.’s (1995) 
analysis of dynamic representation finds that policy adjusts over time to changes in public 
preferences both through the mechanism of elections and through the ‘rational anticipation’ 
of policy-makers. According to this perspective, dynamic representation is positional: when 
the public want more (liberal) or less (conservative) policy, policy-makers oblige with a 
change in policy position. 
Alongside approaches that consider the dynamic representation of preferences, there 
is growing interest in correspondence between the issue priorities of the public and the policy 
priorities of government (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jones et al. 2009; Chaqués Bonafont 
and Palau 2011; Lindeboom 2012). While the public hold opinions across a diverse and 
sometimes competing array of issues and concerns, there is insufficient space on the public 
agenda to attend to all of them (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 4). Some issues tend to be 
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prioritized above others. For example, during a recession healthcare may remain a concern 
for the public but the state of the economy will likely matter more. Agenda-setting describes 
the process through which issues and policy solutions are selected for attention, and make it 
onto the decision-making agenda (or alternatively are excluded)  (e.g. Kingdon 1984; Jones 
and Baumgartner 1993; Jones 1994). As Baumgartner and Jones (2004) and Jones et al. 
(2009) note, this is an important mechanism through which positional (policy) representation 
is mediated, as policy change is often possible only after issues have accessed the agenda. 
The transmission of the priorities of the public into the policy agenda of governing 
institutions itself is a form of representation. One way in which policy-makers can represent 
citizens, is through reflecting their concerns, selectively assigning their attention across issues 
and dealing with policy problems on their behalf. There are prospective risks and rewards at 
the ballot box for policy-makers who fail or succeed to recognize and respond to the concerns 
of the public. Dynamic agenda representation combines elements of what Mansbridge (2003) 
calls ‘promissory’ and ‘anticipatory’ representation. Along the lines of the promissory model, 
voters tend to elect governments who reflect their priorities (McDonald et al. 2004; Pennings 
2005), awarding them a mandate to govern. The idea of electoral mandates tends to be linked 
to a normative expectation that policy-makers stick to their long-standing issue commitments 
and policy priorities. At the same time, policy-makers formulate their priorities knowing that 
failure to represent public concerns may result in electoral punishment at future time points, 
through the phenomenon of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981). An ability to deal with policy 
problems is one of the key dimensions on which voters evaluate candidates and governing 
parties at the ballot box (Petrocik 1996). This motivates ‘rational anticipation’ of the sort 
described by Stimson et al. (1995), where policy-makers adjust their priorities in response to 
changes in the priorities of the public, aware of potential for electoral repercussions. When 
public concern about an issue increases it sends a signal to policy-makers that there may be a 
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future cost for any failure to attend to that issue. Because of the scarcity of attention (e.g. 
Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b), policy-makers must prioritize their 
attention in order to reflect the relative importance of issues to the public. Our general 
expectation concerning dynamic agenda representation in governing institutions is, therefore, 
that changes in the public’s issue priorities are associated with changes in the policy agenda 
of governing institutions (H1).  
H1: The issue priorities of the public are represented in the policy priorities of 
government.  
 
Information-Processing, Friction and Representation in Governing Institutions  
 As Jones et al. (2009, pp. 281-282) have explained, there are a number of reasons to 
expect differences in agenda representation within political systems. Although government 
incorporates information about public preferences in its activities, it faces an abundance of 
information about the state of the world and possesses limited time and resources to process it 
(see Jones 1994; Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b). Executives and legislatures have to 
juggle a range of concerns and policies, selecting a portfolio of issues for attention in light of 
their problem status or their political platforms and pressure from the mass public. Because 
attention is scarce, policy-making is biased towards incrementalism, meaning that a change in 
the salience of an issue can be the crucial factor in policy change (Jones 1994, pp. 5-10).  If 
policy-makers in the higher echelons of government were able to attend to all issues in 
isolation, their decisions could be based on the processing of information about preferences 
alone. However, search and cognitive costs are associated with the retrieval and processing of 
information, meaning decision-makers are able to consider a small number of alternatives 
(Padgett 1980). Faced with a multitude of competing issues and demands, policy-makers 
must decide which issues are most urgent and important to them, prioritizing some of them 
for their attention.  
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In conjunction with this, institutional features of decision-making exert resistance, i.e. 
friction, against change (Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b). Such institutional friction is 
inbuilt in the design of electoral systems, the separation or fusion of powers, majority voting 
rules, formal processes of budgeting and other features of institutional mechanisms. Friction 
creates a threshold that must be exceeded before information signals (i.e. pressure for change) 
are responded to. Attention-shifting and institutional friction, rather than the representation of 
preferences, explain why “…[s]ome aspects of the world are unmonitored, unattended to; 
[while] other aspects are incorporated into the decision process beyond their intrinsic merit” 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005b, p. 334). In view of this, it is important to explain how 
attention scarcity and friction in governing institutions structure the dynamic representation 
of public priorities. 
 
i) Attention-Scarcity: 
 The finite nature of attention, the abundance of information and the importance of 
prioritization in decision-making structure the responsiveness of governing institutions to 
public opinion. Governing institutions can communicate their policy priorities through 
multiple policy agendas and outputs. Congress, for example, can debate issues, pass bills, set 
appropriations, approve appointments, conduct formal oversight and hearings and impeach 
and remove executive and judicial officers. The issue priorities of the public provide a basis 
on which governments can structure their attention. Within some institutional settings such as 
legislatures there are practical limits on the number of issues that policy-makers can attend to 
at a given time. In a speech, such as the State of the Union Addresses, the speaker must get to 
the point and emphasize their main message, communicating priorities in clear terms. In other 
settings such as budgetary expenditure, decision-makers are under less pressure to prioritize 
their commitments between issues with most re-appropriation decisions being a question of 
policy direction rather than whether or not to spend money on a particular issue, making it 
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less important for them to respond to the priorities of the public. Jennings and Wlezien 
(2012) argue that public priorities tend to indicate when the public want more policy, but not 
less, and show that this distorts the representational relationship where policy outputs are 
clearly positional. While priorities tap the public’s assessment of problems they do not 
necessarily indicate the desired direction of policy change, such as expressed in either 
increases or decreases of budgetary spending on an issue. We might expect dynamic agenda 
representation in budgets for those issues where an increase in public concern about an issue 
is associated with a preference for ‘more’ spending. An issue like defence might be the sort 
of domain where correspondence is observed as defence is generally viewed as a problem 
when there are perceived threats to national security (e.g. Wlezien 2005). There are some 
policy domains where public concern about an issue, the economy for example, may not 
simply translate into a preference for more spending (indeed, it might prefer less). Overall, 
though, we expect lower levels of dynamic agenda representation in institutional venues 
where adjustments in policy tend to be positional and do not tend to entail direct trade-offs in 
attention between issues. It makes sense then, that government exhibits differing rates of 
responsiveness depending upon the institutional setting (Jones et al. 2009), since this reflects 
variation in the degree of attention-scarcity.  
 
ii) Institutional Friction: 
 Political institutions impose decision and transaction costs on collective action and 
bargaining: that is, potential blocks or veto points in the legislative and executive branches 
exert friction against change (Jones et al. 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b). When 
change does occur, it must overcome the resistance that has built up. Such institutional costs 
determine the extent to which decision-makers can make adjustments to policy in response to 
new information, for example gaining a place for their proposals on the legislative timetable 
or securing majorities in support of bills.  
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There is strong evidence that friction produces distributions of change in the policy 
agendas and outputs of political institutions that are leptokurtic, characterized by extended 
periods of stability and stickiness, a relatively low frequency of moderate adjustments, and a  
disproportionate number of extreme shifts (see Jones et al. 2003; also Padgett 1980; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b; Baumgartner et al. 2009). For example, budgeting is 
associated with higher levels of friction due to a combination of cognitive and institutional 
costs that increase resistance to change. This determines the capacity of decision-makers to 
respond to information signals from the wider political environment. The idea of institutional 
friction is that low frequencies of the information signal induce a minimal response, whereas 
strong signals produce a disproportionate reaction. For dynamic agenda representation, this 
suggests that the level of institutional friction must be relatively low for there to be a smooth 
and continuous adjustment of the equilibrium relationship between the issue priorities of the 
public and the policy priorities of government.  
 There should therefore be institutional variation in the responsiveness of policy-
makers to the priorities of the public due to differences in the pressure for prioritization in 
governing institutions. When attention is most scarce, government must prioritize between 
multiple competing issues on the agenda. In government activities where resources and time 
are less scarce, and multi-tasking is possible with less direct competition between issues, such 
as budgetary expenditures, the relative prioritization of attention is of less consequence. At 
the same time, institutional rules and procedures can exert friction against shifts in attention. 
It follows that there will be institutional variation in the responsiveness of government to the 
issue priorities of the public, as shown by Baumgartner and Jones (2004), Jones et al. (2009) 
and Chaqués Bonafont and Palau (2011). This should be observable through the comparison 
of cross-institutional and cross-national patterns of representation. 
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H2: The degree of representation of public priorities in the policy agendas of 
governing institutions is higher when decision-making is subject to lower institutional 
friction and a greater scarcity of attention. 
 
Data  
This paper considers the effects of issue priorities of the public on policy agendas 
across institutional venues in the US and UK. These countries provide a classic comparative 
design in the contrast between governing institutions – between federal-presidentialism in the 
US and unitary-parliamentarism in the UK. The design of governing institutions produces 
cross-national variation in degrees of democratic responsiveness through its effects on the 
clarity of responsibility for policy decisions (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). At the same time, 
the internal structure of institutional variation should be consistent across countries – as 
responsiveness to the issue priorities of the public might be expected to differ across 
institutional settings as a function of institutional friction and the scarcity of attention. 
Similarities are therefore expected between countries in the relative degree of responsiveness 
in governing agendas that is observed for different types of institutional venue.  
 This analysis is based on data on public opinion, executive speeches, law-making and 
budgetary expenditure in the US and UK from 1951 to 2003, coded according to the policy 
content coding system of the Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org). The sixteen 
categories investigated in this paper are reported in Table 1, with those topics analyzed for 
budgetary expenditure marked with an asterisk.2 The advantages of this coding framework 
are twofold: firstly, it is an established method for coding government and public attention, 
                                                 
2 The official categories of budgetary expenditure do not cover all policy topics in the 
historical record.  
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and secondly it renders the content of governing agendas comparable across venues and 
across countries (see www.comparativeagendas.org).   
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Public Priorities  
The issues priorities of the public are often measured with survey instruments that ask 
about the ‘most important problem’ (MIP) facing the nation (Wlezien 2005). Following 
previous studies (e.g. Jones 1994), we use aggregate MIP responses to represent the broader 
public prioritization of issues at particular points in time. 3 These are recoded to correspond to 
the Policy Agendas Project major topic codes.4  
 
Policy Agendas in Governing Institutions  
                                                 
3 MIP data is not available in the UK after 2001. Since 1977, however, Ipsos-MORI has 
asked a similar question about the ‘most important issue’ (MII) which been shown to exhibit 
a high degree of common variance and provide a comparable indication of the issues that are 
on people’s minds (Jennings and Wlezien 2011). This enables a continuous measure to be 
constructed: the series are combined and averaged for the period from 1982 to 2000 when 
there is regular overlapping data.  
4 Because the MII data combines responses about defense and foreign affairs, our analysis 
aggregates the Defense (16) and International Affairs (19) topics to ensure the data is 
comparable over time and across countries. This combination generally produced better 
models and greater responsiveness than testing these two topics alone. Further, the analysis 
excludes two topics on which MIP and MII responses were extremely low in both countries: 
Banking (15) and Science (17). 
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 The governing agendas considered in this analysis are drawn from three institutional 
venues in the UK and the US, summarized in Table 2. These provide measures of executive 
agendas, legislative outputs and budgetary expenditure for each of the countries at the 
national level. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
Executive Speeches 
In many political systems the head of state or the head of government delivers an 
annual formal statement setting out its policy priorities for the year ahead. These speeches are 
forward-looking, communicating general priorities and specific measures that the executive 
intends to address in the next year. This substantive function of executive speeches is 
reflected in their transmission into policy outcomes (e.g. Bevan et al. 2011). 
The State of the Union Address in the US5 and the Speech from the Throne in the UK 
are prominent annual speeches that communicate the governing agenda of the executive. The 
policy content of these speeches were divided into quasi-sentences, with each quasi-sentence 
assigned a single unique topic code. Because of the timing of each speech (which occurs in 
January in the US and at the start of the parliamentary session in the UK which can occur 
throughout the year), the executive agenda is organized by calendar year in the US and by 
                                                 
5 The State of the Union Address is of course one of many public messages made by the 
president throughout the year. As Rudalevige (2002) demonstrates, much of the president’s 
programme and influence occurs through other presidential messages. Nevertheless, the State 
of the Union Address is the most visible and comprehensive of the president’s messages and 
represents a unique opportunity to publicly communicate the president’s agenda in its entirety 
(Light 1999). It is therefore directly comparable to the similarly highly visible and important 
Speech from the Throne.  
14 
 
parliamentary session in the UK. This temporal aggregation is also used for legislative 
outputs as well as for public opinion corresponding to the executive and legislative agendas.  
 
Legislative Outputs 
Law-making provides opportunities both for agenda-setting and the signalling of the 
priorities of policy-makers (e.g. Mayhew 1974; Schiller 1995) as well as for the enactment of 
substantive policy outputs. Statutes of the US Congress and Acts of the UK Parliament are 
the major legislative outputs that are considered here. Each law is coded with a single topic 
which indicates the primary focus of the legislation. The observed time point is the date upon 
which the bill was signed into law. Commemorative bills are excluded from the US data so it 
is directly comparable to the UK data. 
 
Budgets  
Whereas the executive and legislative agendas are process measures, public budgeting 
is a substantive government output affecting the allocation of financial resources and, in turn, 
public welfare. The US data on expenditure, adjusted for inflation, is from the US Budget 
Authority, revised using Office of Management and Budget functions and subfunctions to be 
consistent across time. For the UK, data on expenditure is taken from the Blue Book, recoded 
to match the policy agendas coding system.  
 
Institutional Variation in Issue Representation 
These three institutional venues exhibit different patterns of issue competency in each 
country. As Hood (1983) notes, government possesses various policy “tools” with which to 
address particular issues. For example, in both the US and UK responsibility for education is 
largely a local issue, with the implementation of policy delegated to school boards and local 
authorities (with the development of the national curriculum handled by a non-departmental 
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public body in the UK). While there are significant exceptions such as the landmark 
Education Reform Act 1988 in the UK and the No Child Left Behind Act 2001 in the US, 
education policy does not tend to fall within the routine attention of the legislature in either 
country. Executives do, however, attend more to the issue of education policy and its 
delivery. As such, we would expect the executives in both countries to be more responsive to 
public priorities concerning education than the legislature (something we later find, see Table 
4). It is not the purpose of this paper to theorize about how these competencies play out for 
every issue, but these differences in how issues are addressed within each institutional venue 
lead us to expect that institutions in each country will exhibit their own distinctive pattern of 
responsiveness across issues.  
 
Analysis 
Friction in Governing Institutions  
 To test the second hypothesis (H2) concerning the effect of institutions on the 
dynamic representation of public priorities it is necessary to first assess the degree of friction 
present in each of the policy agendas and to compare processes along the policy cycle within 
each country. It is expected that those government processes subject to higher decision costs 
also tend to be associated with to higher levels of friction (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009). To 
ascertain the degree to which decision-making within each of these governing institutions is 
subject to friction against change we use stochastic process methods (following Breunig and 
Jones 2011; Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b; Jones et al. 2003). This tests the normality 
of the distribution of values of the dependent variables for this analysis (i.e. the policy 
content of executive speeches, legislation and budgetary expenditure). With the exception of 
budgets, the “percentage-percentage” calculation method is used to analyse the overall 
distribution of (percentage) change of the difference between (percentage) agenda share in 
one year and the next (see Baumgartner et al. 2009, p. 610). Budgetary spending is not treated 
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as bounded in the same way (i.e. as a percentage) because the numbers involved are much 
larger and because the values are reported in real prices, which removes variation due to 
inflation. Note that for the executive and legislative agendas, cases in which attention to a 
particular topic remains stable at zero are treated as missing to avoid the over-inflation of the 
kurtosis scores. 
The distribution of year-on-year percentage changes is presented in Figure 1, with the 
kurtosis scores super-imposed on each histogram. If the value of the kurtosis statistic is 
greater than three, the distribution exhibits positive kurtosis and can be said to be leptokurtic, 
consistent with the presence of a high degree of cognitive and/or institutional friction. In 
addition, the Shapiro-Wilk test is presented, which considers whether the sample is drawn 
from a normal distribution.  
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Overall, the results are consistent with theoretical expectations regarding the level of 
friction in each of the governing institutions: the highest level of kurtosis in both countries is 
observed for budgetary expenditure, consistent with a large number of studies that show that 
public budgeting exhibits incrementalism, interspersed with occasional extreme disturbances 
(e.g. Padgett 1980; Jones and Baumgartner 2005a; 2005b; Jones et al. 2003; Baumgartner et 
al. 2009). This is evidenced in the tall slender peak and the fat tails of the distributions plotted 
in Figure 1. Indeed, all of the institutions exhibit some evidence of disproportionate 
information-processing in the leptokurtic distributions of attention change. For the UK, the 
pattern of institutional differences is clear, with the lowest kurtosis observed for the executive 
agenda, the next lowest for the legislative agenda and the highest for budgets. This is 
unsurprising in light of the incrementalist tendencies of decision-makers and the numerous 
veto points in budgeting processes. In the US, however, the level of kurtosis is in fact higher 
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for the executive agenda than for legislative outputs. This however reflects a greater degree 
of variation in how different presidents use the State of the Union address. For example, the 
shortest State of the Union message, delivered by President Nixon in 1973, contained just 36 
policy-related statements, while the longest, presented by President Carter in 1981, contained 
1,336. Part of this variation is no doubt due to the unique nature of these particular messages, 
which were written instead of being delivered orally and due to the uniqueness of individual 
presidential character (Neustadt 1960). While the unique nature of the State of the Union 
Address puts the findings in Figure 1 somewhat at odds with expectations concerning the 
ordering of levels of institutional friction, the results nevertheless confirm the presence of 
punctuations. It is further expected that these patterns of institutional friction structure the 
interaction of the priorities of the public and the policy content of governing agendas. 
 
Error-Correction Models of Dynamic Agenda Representation 
To test the dynamic representation of the issue priorities of the public in governing 
agendas, comparing both across institutional levels and across countries, time series error-
correction models are now estimated according to policy topic. The use of an error-correction 
model (ECM) enables diagnosis of both the short- and long-run effects of the issue priorities 
of the public on public policy.6 The error-correction framework is selected in light of past 
studies which demonstrate that, in both theory and practice, that agenda-opinion dynamics 
“… coexist in a long-run equilibrium state that is subject to short-run corrections” (Jennings 
                                                 
6 Note that ordinary least squares estimates are sensitive to departures from normality. Our 
analysis of friction in governing institutions suggests that each of the policy agendas exhibit 
positive kurtosis and while this does not produce bias in the coefficient estimates it can mean 
that the standard errors are no longer efficient (so the p-values are biased downwards, i.e. this 
imposes a stricter test upon our test of representation).    
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and John 2009, p. 838). In other words, dynamic agenda representation can arise from long-
term trends in public priorities and from short-run variation and shocks, i.e. events such as the 
global financial crisis. An ECM framework is appropriate when testing for both 
contemporaneous and lagged effects. The model can be represented in the form:  
 
ΔAGENDAt = α0* + α1*AGENDAt-1 + β0*ΔOPINIONt  + β1*OPINIONt-1 + β2*PARTYt + εt 
 
where short-run changes in the policy agenda relating to a particular issue (ΔAGENDAt) are 
a function of short-run changes in the public’s prioritization of that same topic (ΔOPINIONt), 
the long run changes (OPINIONt-1), and where the lagged value of the dependent variable 
(AGENDAt-1) measures the speed of re-equilibration (α1*) in response to shocks to the long-
run agenda-opinion equilibrium. Consistent both with our theoretical expectations and other 
models of dynamic representation (e.g. Wlezien 2004; Jennings and John 2009), this model 
includes a variable (PARTYt) to capture the contemporaneous effects of indirect 
representation through partisan control of government. This controls for difference in the 
governing agendas of political parties, and is coded 1 for the Conservative Party in the UK 
case and the Republican Party in the US case and is coded 0 for the Labour Party in the UK 
and for the Democratic Party in the US.7 
Within the ECM framework, changes in the policy content of governing agendas are 
estimated as a function of contemporaneous changes in the issue priorities of the public and 
the degree to which these are outside the long-run agenda/opinion equilibrium. This suggests 
that if the governing agenda deviates from its long-run equilibrium, as the institution commits 
                                                 
7 For Statutes in the US and for US budgets the variable was coded according to which party 
was the majority party in the House of Congress. Other measures of partisan control in the 
US, such as Senate majority party and a variable measuring House, Senate and presidential 
control were also tested and produce the same general inferences.   
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either “too much” or “too little” attention to a particular issue, responsiveness is equal to the 
degree of equilibration that restores correspondence between the agenda and public opinion 
to its previous status quo.  
 
Pooled Analyses 
 To first assess the general pattern of dynamic agenda representation, a time series 
cross-sectional ECM is estimated for the seven policy topics that are common to each 
institution. This pooled model specification has the advantage of measuring the degree to 
which the policy agenda of each governing institution is representative, overall, of public 
priorities. The results that are reported in Table 3 show rather limited evidence of dynamic 
representation: the long-run (lagged) effect of the issue priorities of the public is positive and 
significant, at the 95 per cent confidence level, for the executive agenda in the US and for the 
legislative outputs in the US and the UK, while the short-run effect of public priorities is 
significant for legislative outputs in the UK. Further, there is no evidence of representation in 
the link between public priorities and changes in budgetary expenditures in either the US or 
the UK. In addition, the negative and significant error-correction parameter (AGENDAt-1) for 
the executive and legislative agendas indicates that shocks to the long-run equilibrium of the 
policy agenda are corrected over time. The absence of a similar effect for budgetary 
expenditure (indeed, the parameter is positive and significant for the UK) suggests that errors 
tend to accumulate. This is consistent with the high level of institutional friction in budgeting 
compared to the other venues, with the build-up of errors contributing to punctuations in 
policy change. The absence of a significant link between public priorities and the executive 
agenda in the UK, in contrast, might be attributable to the lack of a general pattern of 
representation, rather than suggesting that the policy agenda is unresponsive on all topics.  
 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
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While the use of a time series cross-sectional framework enables comparison of the 
structure of representation across institutions and across countries, it is possible that 
unresponsiveness on some issues might cancel out responsiveness on others, obscuring 
important features of the underlying categories, i.e. the policy agenda might be responsive for 
a number of the most salient topics (such as the economy and defense) but this would not 
necessarily be reflected in the pooled analysis. Indeed, variation in rates of responsiveness for 
individual issues is to be expected due to differences in the intrinsic importance of certain 
issues to citizens (Page and Shapiro 1983; Jones 1994; see Burstein 2003 for a review) and 
because government agendas possess policy ‘tools’ or instruments that are optimised to solve 
certain types of problem (Hood 1983). Therefore, an issue-level analysis is needed to fully 
test the dynamic interrelationship between public priorities and policy agendas.  
 
Individual Topic Analyses  
To assess issue-specific patterns of dynamic agenda representation in each of the 
institutional venues, seventy-eight8 individual ECMs are next estimated. Table 4 summarizes 
the findings on the short-run and long-run effects of the issue priorities of the public on the 
policy content each of the institutional agendas, in each of the countries, by presenting the 
coefficient estimates for each topic (full results are reported in the Online Appendix, Tables 
A1 to A6). The topics are reported in the first column and the responsiveness coefficients for 
each of the governing agendas are presented in turn across the columns of Table 4, enabling 
comparison across the two countries and across institutions. For each topic, the direction, size 
and significance of the responsiveness of governing agendas is measured with the short- and 
long-run effects of public issue priorities. The final three rows of Table 4 further indicate the 
                                                 
8 This figure includes sixteen models for the executive and the legislative agenda and seven 
models for the budgetary agenda in each of the two countries (16 + 16 + 7) * 2 = 78.  
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general pattern of dynamic agenda representation, summarizing the total number of topics for 
which the issue priorities of the public have a positive short-run, long-run or either effect on 
the policy content of each institutional agenda.  
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
These results show that the policy agendas of governing institutions in the US and the 
UK exhibit a substantial degree of responsiveness to the issue priorities of the public (H1). 
Specifically, statistically significant short- or long-run effects of public priorities are observed 
in four or more of the sixteen topics for the executive agenda and legislative outputs. In the 
US, the executive agenda is responsive to public priorities for seven out of the sixteen topics 
(health, agriculture, education, environment, energy, law and order and social welfare) while 
in the UK it is responsive for six (macroeconomic issues, health, education, environment, law 
and order and housing). In the US, legislative outputs are responsive for five of the sixteen 
topics (macroeconomic issues, environment, energy, social welfare and defence and foreign 
affairs) and in the UK for four (macroeconomic issues, environment, public lands and 
territorial issues and defence and foreign affairs). It is interesting to note that there is little 
overlap in responsiveness within each country from institution to institution. This suggests 
these institutional agendas have different competencies as we discussed earlier. Furthermore 
our example concerning education holds, with executive agendas in both the US and the UK 
demonstrating significant responsiveness to public priorities, with no responsiveness in either 
legislative agenda.  
In contrast to these findings, there are no significant effects for budgetary expenditure 
in any of the seven topics tested here. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that a 
decision-making venue like budgeting which lacks the same pressure for serial-processing 
and the prioritization of issues is less likely to be responsive to public priorities. Further, in a 
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few cases across the executive, legislative and budgetary agendas the coefficient estimates 
are negative and significant suggesting that change in the policy agenda leads public concern 
about that issue. For example, a short-run increase in US spending on education precedes a 
decrease in the public’s prioritization of the same issue. It is therefore possible for agendas to 
shape public priorities. Overall, these results provide strong evidence of a link between the 
issue priorities of the public and the policy agenda of governing institutions in both countries 
(H1). Of all institutional venues, public priorities have the strongest effect, on average, on the 
executive agenda in terms of the frequency of statistical significance of short- and long-run 
effects. The results do not enable direct comparison of the level of responsiveness either 
between countries or institutions because the measure of the policy agenda in each institution 
uses a different unit of analysis (i.e. speeches, legislation and expenditure) and the mean level 
varies between countries. Further, the volume of statutes passed in the US far exceeds the 
volume of acts passed in the UK.9  
The higher levels of agenda representation observed for executive speeches followed 
by legislation, in comparison to budgetary spending, indicate variation between institutional 
settings, consistent with theoretical expectations (H2) and the pattern of friction reported 
earlier. The responsiveness of policy agendas to the issue priorities of the public is highest in 
institutional settings where attention is most scarce (executive speeches), which requires that 
decision-makers prioritize between issues, and is lowest in the institutional venue subject to 
the highest degree of friction (budgetary expenditure).   
 While there is variation at the topic level, there are many similarities between the US 
and the UK in the responsiveness of governing institutions to the issue priorities of the public. 
                                                 
9 Although a proportionalized modeling strategy might seem a solution to this problem, 
because these agendas are substantively different across institutions in the unit of analysis, 
this would only mask the underlying issue.  
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For example, there is no opinion-responsiveness in the executive agenda or budgetary 
spending for defence and foreign affairs in either the US or the UK while there is evidence of 
responsiveness in legislative outputs in both countries in the short- and the long-run (with the 
long-run effects in the UK being significant at the 90 per cent confidence level). For law and 
order on the other hand, the executive agenda is responsive to public priorities in the long-run 
in both the US and the UK (as well as being responsive in the short-run in the US), while 
public priorities do not have a significant effect on legislative outputs for the same topic in 
either country. There is nevertheless variation in responsiveness across institutions between 
the US and the UK that is likely driven by differences in the level of importance of issues to 
citizens (Page and Shapiro 1983; Jones 1994; also see Burstein 2003) and due to the ability of 
particular institutional agendas to better address certain issues (Hood 1983). Institutional 
variation therefore structures the overall pattern of representation (H2), where governing 
agendas in which the attention of decision-makers is most scarce or subject to lower levels of 
friction tend to be more responsive, but also leads to variation in dynamic representation 
across issues.  
 The non-responsiveness of budgetary expenditure is an interesting finding that further 
confirms previous evidence that spending is not responsive to public concern about the “most 
important problem” in contrast to relative preferences (Wlezien 2005). This is perhaps 
because whereas budgets have directional implications, and the public can prefer either more 
or less spending in a particular policy domain, changes in the issue priorities of the public do 
not signal the desired direction of change (Jennings and Wlezien 2012). For example, the 
issue of healthcare might be highly salient to the public either because the government is 
spending too much or too little on it. The issue priorities of the public are, however, a useful 
information signal for valence issues; i.e. those issues on which there is broad consensus over 
ends, such as lower crime or economic growth (Stokes 1963). 
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Conclusion 
 The sorting of issues for attention by political institutions is an important mechanism 
through which representation occurs. If public priorities change, and the policy priorities of 
government change in response, this is dynamic agenda representation. The transmission of 
the priorities of the public into the priorities of government is mediated through institutions, 
due to institutional friction in decision-making or the scarcity of attention. This comparative 
analysis provides extensive evidence of the effect of the issue priorities of the public on the 
policy agenda of governing institutions in the US and the UK over more than half a century. 
It reveals cross-national similarities, with a systematic pattern of responsiveness to public 
priorities across institutional venues. There is responsiveness of the executive and legislative 
agenda to public priorities in both countries across a range of issues. There is no similar 
responsiveness with respect to budgetary expenditures. The pattern of dynamic agenda 
representation across institutions is consistent within countries – supporting the theoretical 
expectation of variation across institutional settings due to attention scarcity and institutional 
friction. The degree of responsiveness is greater in policy agendas when attention is most 
scarce (i.e. speeches) and declines as decision-makers’ attention becomes less scarce, and less 
concerned with agenda-setting and the signalling of policy priorities, and is subject to higher 
levels of cognitive and institutional friction (i.e. expenditure). Such variation occurs because 
the ability and willingness of policy-makers to respond to public priorities varies according to 
the issue at hand as well as the institutional venue, with each agenda having a unique set of 
competencies based on their policy instruments and national context, such as for the case of 
education in the US and the UK. 
 Our results suggest that budgetary expenditure is not responsive to the issue priorities 
of the public in the same way. This finding differs from studies that demonstrate the effect of 
public preferences on budgetary spending (e.g. Ostrom and Marra 1986; Wlezien 1996; 
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Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Budgets entail clear distributive and positional implications and 
changes in public priorities do not signal the desired direction of change, unlike preferences. 
Nevertheless, it might be expected that an increase in the public’s prioritization of a particular 
issue might be associated with a corresponding preference for increased spending, and an 
expectation that government ‘take action’. The results here suggest that this is not the case (or 
at least this effect is not detected). To start to get to the bottom of this puzzle, it would be 
necessary to compare the responsiveness of public policy to public priorities and preferences 
side-by-side. 
This analysis also points towards possible normative criteria for the assessment of the 
relationship between agenda-setting and representative government, in particular in relation 
to promissory and anticipatory forms of representation. These concern whether policy-makers 
are expected to look backwards (to their electoral mandate) or look forwards (towards future 
elections). Further, the possibility for rational anticipation, Mansbridge (2003, p. 518) argues, 
requires normative interpretations to “become systemic”, assessing the responsiveness of the 
political system in the aggregate. Through its analysis of agenda representation over time this 
paper has sought to understand the adaptive, equilibrating nature of political attention.  
Processes of dynamic agenda representation can be understood via the transmission of 
the priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The attention-dimension 
of representation is significant in assessing the degree to which government attends to issues 
of concern to the public. Variation in the observed pattern of dynamic agenda representation 
between governing processes, repeated across counties, suggests that the institutional scarcity 
of attention and friction in decision-making structures the degree of responsiveness to public 
priorities. Further investigation is required, however, to determine whether these findings are 
replicated elsewhere.  
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Figure 1. Change Distributions in Executive, Legislative and Budgeting Agendas in the US and the UK, 1951 – 2003  
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Table 1. Policy Agendas Project Major Topic Codes 
 
Topic Abbreviation Name 
1 Economy Macroeconomics* 
2 Civil Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties 
3 Health Health* 
4 Agriculture Agriculture 
5 Labor Labor, Employment, and Immigration 
6 Education Education* 
7 Environment Environment 
8 Energy Energy 
10 Transport Transportation 
12 Law Law, Crime, and Family Issues* 
13 Social Social Welfare* 
14 Housing Community Development, Planning and Housing Issues* 
18 Trade Foreign Trade 
20 Gov't Government Operations 
21 Lands Public Lands and  Water Management 
16/19 Foreign Defense, International Affairs and Foreign Aid* 
 
Note: * Indicates a Major Topic that is tested for budgetary expenditure in this paper. 
 
Policy Agendas Topic Codebook, see www.policyagendas.org  
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Table 2. Government Agendas by Country and Venue 
 United States United Kingdom 
Executive State of the Union Speech from the Throne 
Legislative Statutes of the US Congress Acts of the UK Parliament 
Budgetary US Federal Budget UK Government Expenditure 
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Table 3. Time Series Cross-Sectional Model of Public Priorities and Government Agendas  
  ΔAgendat  
 Executive Legislation Budget 
 US UK US UK US UK 
Δ Opiniont 0.233 -0.053 0.077 0.072** 258.254 39.629 
 (0.321) (0.033) (0.087) (0.027) (202.967) (31.735) 
Opiniont-1 0.890*** 0.020 0.228*** 0.048*** 96.024 -14.862 
 (0.171) (0.015) (0.049) (0.013) (105.212) (14.928) 
Agendat-1 -0.864*** -0.518*** -0.622*** -0.994*** 0.013 0.020** 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.010) (0.007) 
Partyt -2.186 -0.468 -6.013*** 0.275 6064.818† -336.452 
 (3.472) (0.331) (1.287) (0.276) (3140.560) (324.371) 
Constant 14.375*** 3.414** 7.390*** 3.556*** 803.301 739.139† 
 (3.307) (0.446) (0.887) (0.333) (1971.571) (389.697) 
R2 0.438 0.267 0.306 0.498 0.031 0.034 
 
Note * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10; N=364 (7 Topics * 52 Years); Start=1951, End=2003 
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Table 4. Summary of the Effects of Public Priorities on Government Agendas 
    Executive Legislation Budget 
    US  UK US UK US  UK
1 - Economy 
 
Short -0.064 0.056 0.129* 0.080† 0.441 76.661 
Long 0.269  0.083*** -0.032 0.055* -0.272  -20.561
2 - Civil 
 
Short -0.156 -0.333* -0.119† 0.088   
Long -0.140  -0.399* -0.101† 0.038  
3 - Health 
 
Short 0.515 -0.030 -0.558* 0.072 72.673 -12.042 
Long 0.972*  0.111*** -0.042 0.031 -72.474  62.198
4 - Agriculture 
 
Short 4.435* -0.090 1.929† -0.206   
Long 2.274  -0.169 0.740 -0.322  
5 - Labor 
 
Short -1.001 0.040 0.253 0.007   
Long 1.826  0.059† -0.247 0.055†  
6 - Education 
 
Short 6.476** -0.031 0.487 0.110 -1675.423* 49.732 
Long 4.014***  0.283* 0.191 0.035 -421.279  146.878
7 - Environment 
 
Short 3.407** 0.376* 1.846† -0.396†   
Long 0.249  0.527*** 2.293** 0.490*  
8 - Energy 
 
Short 0.628 0.020 0.215 0.058   
Long 2.759***  0.236 0.446* -0.006  
10 - Transport 
 
Short 14.760 0.500† 14.725 0.259   
Long 47.080  0.121 36.067 0.517  
12 - Law 
 
Short 1.312** 0.032 0.085 -0.178 -5.905 -82.274 
Long 1.235***  0.462*** -0.047 0.113 -7.519  -155.718**
13 - Social 
 
Short 1.860† 0.064 0.160 -0.113 1151.909 -106.974 
Long 1.321*  0.100 0.411* -0.196** 855.517  -246.707
14 - Housing 
 
Short 3.028 -0.174 1.321 -0.132 -6772.070 -216.407 
Long 1.808  0.161* 1.257 0.138 -2370.936  62.027
18 - Trade 
 
Short -1.080 0.070 -3.594* 0.030   
Long 0.600  0.123 -5.615** 0.097  
20 - Gov't 
 
Short -0.617 0.359 1.370 -0.502   
Long 0.247  0.134 -2.049† -0.695  
21 - Lands 
 
Short -34.261 0.123 -383.446 0.073   
Long 15.206  0.019 -269.913 0.445**  
16/19 - Foreign 
 
Short -1.191 -0.367** 0.446* 0.122* 403.245 12.608 
Long 0.904  -0.181** 0.348* 0.045† 555.18 1  -25.406
        
Total 
Responsive 
Topics 
Short 4 1 2 1 0 0 
Long 5 6 4 3 0 0 
Either 7 6 5 4 0 0 
Note * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10  
 
